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Abstract
This paper concerns income and commodity taxation in a multi-jurisdictional
framework with transboundary environmental damage. We assume that each ju-
risdiction is large in the sense that its government is able to inﬂuence the world
market prices via public policy. In such a framework, a noncooperative Nash equi-
librium does not only imply that the commodity tax on the externality-generating
good is ineﬃciently low seen from the perspective of global well-being; it also
means that the marginal income tax rate is ineﬃciently high, and that too much
resources are spent on public goods. With the noncooperative Nash equilibrium
as a starting point, we also consider the welfare eﬀects of policy coordination with
respect to taxation and public expenditures.
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11 Introduction
In the literature on transboundary environmental problems, it has been
recognized that national environmental policies may fail to fully internal-
ize externalities, and that policy cooperation among countries (or regions)
is generally required in order to reach a globally optimal resource alloca-
tion. There are several sources of ineﬃciency associated with noncooperative
policies. For instance, individual countries are likely to disregard the trans-
boundary component of the environmental damage they cause, since their
policy-decisions are typically governed by national objectives, and their poli-
cies may also give rise to side eﬀects via changes in the price system. How-
ever, despite the existence of certain supranational aggrements, there is still
substantial room for policies decided upon at the national level, suggest-
ing that the incentives underlying decentralized policies are important to
understand.
This paper concerns transboundary environmental problems in a frame-
work with mixed taxation, where each national government faces a nonlinear
income tax and linear commodity taxes. This provides a reasonably real-
istic description of the tax system facing many national governments, and
implies that the use of distortionary taxes is a consequence of optimization;
not of restrictions imposed on the choice set of the government. In addi-
tion, and contrary to earlier literature on environmental policy under mixed
taxation, we assume that the countries are large in the sense that each na-
tional government is able to signiﬁcantly aﬀect the world market producer
price of the externality-generating commodity. The latter is interesting for
at least two reasons. First, although many countries are small enough to
make the ’price-taking government’ assumption realistic, the environmental
policy scene is also characterized by large actors such as the U.S. and some
other countries, as well as by subgroups of countries acting together such
a st h eE U ,w h e r et h ep r i c e - t a k i n ga s s u m p t i o na p p e a r st ob el e s sr e a l i s t i c .
Our paper takes this argument to its extreme by analyzing a world economy
2comprising two large countries. Second, our approach integrates earlier lit-
erature on the so called ’leakage’ phenomenon (see below) with the theory of
income and commodity taxation, which makes it possible to compare large
and small open economies with respect to the whole tax and expenditure
structure; not just with respect to environmental policy.
The literature on ﬁscal policy in economies with transboundary environ-
mental problems is relatively small by comparison with other literature on
ﬁscal policy and environmental externalities1. Earlier research on taxation
and public expenditures in economies causing and/or suﬀering from trans-
boundary externalities compares noncooperative and cooperative resource
allocations from the perspective of environmental and/or other policies2 as
well as addresses issues such as labor mobility3, ﬁscal competition due to
international trade4 and strategic aspects of environmental policy in eco-
nomic federations5. However, none of the earlier studies that we are aware
of combines transboundary environmental problems and mixed taxation in
the context of large open economies. An interesting observation (discussed
m a n yt i m e si no t h e rc o n t e x t s )i st h a tt h e r em i g h tb ee m i s s i o n - l e a k a g ea s -
sociated with environmental policy decided upon by national governments;
for instance, if higher emission taxes in a particular jurisdiction signiﬁcantly
reduces the demand for the externality-generating good, then the producer
price of this good will also decrease which, in turn, tends to increase the
1Earlier literature on ﬁscal policy under environmental externalities often abstracts
from international (or interregional) spillover eﬀects of environmental damage by focusing
on ’one-country’ model-economies. See the seminal contribution by Sandmo (1975) and
the subsequent work by e.g. Pirttilä and Tuomala (1997) and Cremer and Gahvari (2001).
See also the related research on environmental policy reforms and so called ’double-
dividends’, e.g. Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994), Bovenberg and Goulder (1996), Parry
et al. (1999) and Aronsson (1999).
2See e.g. van der Ploeg and de Zeuuw (1992) and Aronsson and Blomquist (2003).
3See Aronsson and Blomquist (2003).
4See Cremer and Gahvari (2004, 2005).
5See Caplan and Silva (1999), Silva and Caplan (1997) and Aronsson et al. (2006).
3emissions abroad6. This suggests that, if the country is large in the sense
that its government can signiﬁcantly aﬀect the world market prices, then it
may have incentives to modify its ﬁscal policy accordingly. Our paper incor-
porates this mechanism into the theory of income and commodity taxation.
This paper is based on a two-country world economy with transboundary
environmental damage (deﬁned as a climate-problem), where the govern-
ment in each country faces a mixed tax problem and provides a (national)
public good. We also assume that both countries are large enough for their
g o v e r n m e n t st ob ea b l et os i g n i ﬁcantly aﬀe c tt h ew o r l dm a r k e tp r o d u c e r
price of the externality-generating good via public policy. In addition, the
countries behave as Nash competitors to one another, in the sense that the
government in each country treats the policy variables of the other country
as exogenous. The paper contributes to the literature in primarily two ways.
The ﬁrst is by characterizing the income and commodity tax structure as
well as the provision of the public good in the resulting Nash equilibrium.
This also means comparing the policy outcome with the policies that would
be chosen by small open economies and the policies implicit in a cooperative
equilibrium, respectively. We show that if the governments are able to aﬀect
the producer prices, then the resulting equilibrium does not only imply that
the commodity tax on the externality-generating good is ineﬃciently low
seen from the perspective of global well-being; it also means that the mar-
ginal income tax rate is ineﬃciently high, and that too much resources are
spent on the public good. The second is contribution is to analyze the wel-
fare eﬀects of policy coordination in a framework with endogenous producer
prices, where the prereform resource allocation is given by the noncoopera-
tive Nash equilibrium. Our idea is to examine how marginal coordination
with respect to the policy instruments can be used to improve the resource
6Various mechanisms by which emission-leakage may appear have been discussed by
e.g. Gurzgen and Rauscher (2000), Conconi (2003) and Lai and Hu (2005). See also the
empirical study by Sengupta and Bhardwaj (2004), which is a case study applied to India.
4allocation. We show that several welfare improving reforms are possible.
One such reform would be to simultaneously increase the commodity tax on
the dirty good and the provision of the public good, whereas another is to
increase both the marginal and average income tax rates.
To be able to focus on the tax structure, we disregard trade policy in what
follows; an assumption which appears to be in line with the observed trend
towards trade liberalization. In addition, instead of analyzing redistribution
as part of the policy package decided upon by each national government,
as in some earlier literature on mixed taxation, we follow Fuest and Huber
(1997) and Aronsson and Sjögren (2004) by disregarding motives for using
distortionary taxes that apply under perfect competition (such as asymmet-
r i ci n f o r m a t i o n ) .T h e r e f o r e ,t h ep r e s e n c eo fm a r k e tf a i l u r e sc o n s t i t u t e st h e
only reason for using distortionary taxes in our paper. This does not reﬂect
a belief that the self-selection motive for taxation is unimportant; only that
it is well understood from earlier research, whereas the aspects of tax policy
discussed here are not. Our results will, of course, also apply in a more gen-
eral framework, where the individuals in each country are allowed to diﬀer
in terms of ability.
The outline of the study is as follows. In section 2, we present the
model and the outcome of private optimization. Section 3 concerns optimal
taxation and provision of the public good at the national level, whereas
policy coordination is addressed in section 4. We summarize and discuss the
results in section 5.
2T h e M o d e l
Consider an economy which consists of two jurisdictions - to be called ’coun-
tries’ in what follows - which are denoted by superindices 1 and 2, respec-
tively. The countries are identical in all important repects, and each country
consists of identical consumers. For notational convenience, we normalize
5the number of consumers in each country to one.
The preferences of the consumer living in country i are deﬁned by the
utility function Ui = U(Ci,Xi,Zi,G i,E),f o ri =1 ,2,w h e r eCi is an en-
vironmentally clean good, Xi an environmentally dirty good, Zi leisure, Gi
a public good and E environmental damage. We assume that Ci and Xi
are normal goods. Leisure is deﬁned as Zi = H − Li,w h e r eH is a time
endowment and Li the hours of work. The function U(·) is increasing in
Ci, Xi, Zi and Gi,d e c r e a s i n gi nE and strictly quasiconcave. The envi-
ronmental damage is caused by consumption of the dirty good (see below),
and the consumers treat E as exogenous. The clean good is untaxed and its
price is normalized to one. The consumer price of the dirty good is given
by Qi = P + ti,w h e r eP is the producer price and ti the commodity tax
decided upon by the government in country i. Since the dirty good is subject
to international trade, both countries face the same producer price.












i =0 ,( 1 )
where T(·) is the income tax payment. Following Christiansen (1984), it will
be convenient to solve the consumer’s optimization problem in two stages.

















in which Bi is treated as a ﬁxed post-tax income. The solution to this
































for i =1 ,2. These functions will be used in the optimal tax and expenditure
problem to be discussed below. In the second stage, we can derive the hours
of work by maximizing the conditional indirect utility function with respect























B = ∂V i/∂Bi and V i
Z = ∂V i/∂Zi, while Ti
I = ∂T (Ii)/∂Ii is the
marginal income tax rate and Ii = wiLi is the labor income.
The production side in each country consists of two private sectors, which
are both competitive; sector c produces the clean good and sector d produces




G, respectively) and a ﬁxed factor (which is suppressed
for notational convenience) are the only inputs in production. Labor is mo-
bile between the domestic sectors, although it is immobile internationally7.
7This assumption simpliﬁes the analysis considerably, as it implies that the trans-
boundary externality is the only source of direct interaction. As such, this assumption
makes it possible to analyze the policy incentives created by endogenous world market
prices in an otherwise standard model for optimal taxation and externality-correction.
Aronsson and Blomquist (2003) consider the consequences of labor mobility for mixed
taxation and externality-correction, although the producer prices are exogenous in their
model.
7To simplify further, we assume that the ﬁxed factors are owned by the gov-
ernment8.
The production function for the public good is given by Gi = FG(Li
G),
w h i c hi si n c r e a s i n ga n ds t r i c t l yc o n c a v ei ni t sa r g u m e n t . I ne a c hp r i v a t e
sector, the ﬁrms are identical and we normalize the number of ﬁrms in each
sector to one. The proﬁt, i.e. the return on the ﬁxed factor, in sector c and

















The production functions, Fc (·) and Fd (·), are assumed to be increasing and
strictly concave in their respective argument. As the workers are perfectly
mobile between the public and private sectors, the wage rate will be the



















we can deﬁne wi, Li
c and Li
d as functions of P and Li−Li
G. Therefore, substi-
tuting Li
c = Lc (Li − Li
G,P) and Li
d = Ld (Li − Li
G,P) into the production







































8An alternative would be to assume that the ﬁxed factors are owned by the consumer
and subject to taxation. Since the consumers are identical by assumption, this distinction
is not important for the results.
8Since the two private goods are subject to international trade, market equi-






















As long as equation (13) is fulﬁlled, Walras’ law implies that the market for
the clean good is in equilibrium as well. Equation (13) implicitly deﬁnes the
















for k 6= i, where we have used Li = H − Zi and Lk = H − Zk as well as
suppressed the time endowment, H.













which means that the environmental damage facing the residents in each
country is given by the sum of the two countries’ conumption of the dirty
good.

















3 Public Policy at the National Level
It is convenient to begin by brieﬂy considering two special cases of the model
set out above; (i) a noncooperative Nash equilibrium with ﬁxed producer
prices (i.e. small open economies) and (ii) a cooperative equilibrium (a
closed economy). Both these equilibrium concepts have been addressed in
earlier research on environmental policy under mixed taxation9;l e tb et h a t
9See Aronsson and Blomquist (2003).
9the earlier research dealing with the cooperative equilibrium did not consider
endogenous producer prices. The basic idea is to provide a reference case,
which is (more or less) known from earlier research. Having done that, our
main purpose is to analyze the income and commodity tax structure as well
as the provision of the public good in the noncooperative Nash equilibrium
with endogenous producer prices.
3.1 Brieﬂy on Two Special Cases
A noncooperative Nash equilibrium is commonly derived by assuming that
each national government solves a domestic optimal tax and expenditure
problem, in which it treats the policy instruments of the other country as
exogenous. The cooperative equilibrium, on the other hand, is often based
on the assumption that the economic policies in both countries are decided
upon by a global social planner, who maximizes the sum of the two country-
speciﬁc objectives (or, more generally, a weighted sum) subject to a resource
constraint for the economy as a whole. The latter is, of course, equivalent to
a closed economy, as it implies that the two countries are merged together
into a single jurisdiction from the perspective of economic policy. Given the
model set out above, the main diﬀerence between these resource allocations
is that, in a noncooperative Nash equilirium, each national government only
internalizes the part of the domestically created externality that inﬂuences
the domestic residents, whereas the cooperative resource allocation means
that all externalities are internalized at the global level.
However, provided that the noncooperative Nash equilibrium is derived
under the assumption of exogenous producer prices, these two resource allo-
cations will, nevertheless, share some common characteristics with regards
















10Note that ∂V i/∂Bi = ∂Ui/∂Ci.
10to be the marginal willingness to pay by the resident in country i for a small
reduction in the environmental damage, the marginal rate of substitution
between the public good and private income for the resident in country i
and the marginal rate of transformation between the numeraire and the
public good in country i, respectively.
Then, if the resource allocation is a noncooperative Nash equilibrium










C,G for i =1 ,2 (17)
This has been established by earlier research. If, on the other hand, the
two countries are merged into a closed economy, with either exogenous or













C,G for i =1 ,2 (18)
In summary, therefore, we have established the following result;
Proposition 1 Within the given framework, if the resource allocation is a
noncooperative Nash equilibrium based on exogenous producer prices, or a
cooperative equilibrium based on either exogenous or endogenous producer
prices, the commodity tax is used solely for externality-correction, whereas
the marginal income tax rate is zero. Furthermore, both regimes imply that
t h ep u b l i cg o o do b e y st h eS a m u e l s o nr u l e .
These reults will serve as a benchmark for the analyses to be carried out in
the next subsection.
3.2 Noncooperative Nash Equilibrium with Endogenous Producer
Prices
Next, let us characterize the tax and expenditure structure implicit in the
noncooperative Nash equilibrium with endogenous producer prices. As men-
11tioned above, each national government solves a domestic optimal tax and









































for i =1 ,2,a n dk 6= i,w h e r ek represents ”the other country”. In addi-
tion, note that the producer price of the dirty good is endogenous to the
government and determined by equation (14). Equation (20) is the budget
constraint facing the government, which is derived by using equation (16)
together with the private budget constraint given by equation (5), the objec-
tive functions of the two representative ﬁrms, i.e. equations (7) and (8), and
t h et i m ec o n s t r a i n tLi = Li
c + Li
d + Li
G.N o t et h a tT(·) is a general income
tax; it can be used to implement any desired combination of work hours
and private income. It is, therefore, convenient to use Li and Bi,i n s t e a d
of the parameters of T(·), as direct decision variables for the government.
Therefore, the optimal tax and expenditure problem is written such that
the income tax function is replaced by Li and Bi. Equation (21) is the pro-
duction function for the public good, whereas equation (22) summarizes the
relationship between the externality and the aggregate consumption of the
dirty good; its appearance as an explicit constraint means that E is treated
as an additional (and artiﬁcial) decision variable. This formulation allows
us to deﬁne a shadow price of E facing each national government, which will

















































for i =1 ,2 and k 6= i,w h e r eλi, γi and μi a r eL a g r a n g em u l t i p l i e r s .T h eﬁrst
order conditions are presented in the Appendix. Since the two countries are
identical by assumption, we concentrate on the implications of a symmetric
Nash equilibrium in what follows.
Earlier research on environmental policy in the context of mixed taxa-
tion11 shows that the shadow price of environmental damage over the shadow
price of the government’s budget constraint, μi/γi, plays an important role
for the tax structure. We can interpret μi/γi as the marginal value of reduced
environmental damage for country i measured in terms of its tax revenues.
Consider Proposition 2;
Proposition 2 In the symmetric noncooperative Nash equilibrium, where
the producer price of the dirty good is endogenous to the national govern-
ments, the shadow price of environmental damage over the shadow price of







Proof: See the Appendix.
To interpret Proposition 2, recall ﬁrst that the case with exogenous producer
prices (brieﬂy addressed in the previous subsection) means that μi/γi =
MWPi
E,B. Therefore, relaxing the ’small open economy assumption’ adds
one additional term to the (domestic) marginal value of environmental qual-
ity; namely, ti(∂Xk/∂E).T h i se ﬀect arises because a domestically generated
11See.e.g. Pirttilä and Tuomala (1997).
13increase in E leads to a change in the consumption of the dirty good in the
other country. The intuition is that, if a domestically generated increase
in E causes an increase (a decrease) in Xk,s o∂Xk/∂E>0 (< 0), there
is an incentive for the government in country i to try to inﬂuence Xk via
public policy by reducing E more (less) than it would otherwise have done.
As such, this implies that the government attaches a higher (lower) value to
reduced environmental damage. However, if the utility function is weakly
separable in E, meaning that ∂Xk/∂E =0 , this additional eﬀect vanishes
and μi/γi = MWPi
E,B.
Let us now turn to the commodity tax structure. Does the endogeneity
of the producer price of the dirty good only modify the commodity tax via
the valuation of environmental damage, or does it imply other modiﬁcations
as well in comparison with the previous subsection? To simplify the tax



















where 0 < φi < 1,s i n c e∂Xk/∂Qk < 0 and
¯ ¯∂Xk/∂Qk¯ ¯ < ρi.C o n s i d e r
Proposition 3;
Proposition 3 In the symmetric12 noncooperative Nash equilibrium, where
the producer price of the dirty good is endogenous to the national govern-
12If we were to relax the assumption that the equilibrium is symmetric, then each tax





where NXi is the net export of the dirty good. However, as we are considering a sym-
metric equilibrium, NXi =0 , meaning that the terms of trade eﬀect vanishes. This will
be true for all policy formulas derived below.





Proof: See the Appendix.
By comparison with the small open economy, where ti = μi/γi,P r o p o s i t i o n
3 implies that the commodity tax is scaled down by the variable φi ∈ (0,1),
so it falls short of the value attached to reduced environmental damage.
Note also that this holds irrespective of whether or not the utility function
is weakly separable in the environmental damage. If the consumption of the
dirty good is a weakly decreasing function of the environmental damage, so
∂Xi/∂E ≤ 0 (which includes weak separability as a special case), our result
means that ti <M W P i
E,B, indicating a policy where the commodity tax
falls short of the consumer’s marginal willingness to pay for environmental
quality.
The intuition behind Proposition 3 is that each national government
perceives to have the possibility of reducing the consumption of the dirty
good in the other country. This can be accomplished by exercising inﬂuence
over the world market producer price of the dirty good. By reducing its
own commodity tax below μi/γi, the domestic demand for the dirty good
increases in country i, which has a zero ﬁrst order domestic welfare eﬀect if
measured conditional on P. On the other hand, a higher domestic demand
in country i increases P, which leads to a higher consumer price in country
k (conditional on tk). The subsequent reduction of Xk increases welfare in
country i.
Given the framework set out above, we saw in the previous subsection
that a small open economy (which treats the producer price of the dirty
good as exogenous) chooses a zero marginal income tax rate, meaning that
the income tax is equivalent to a lump-sum tax. The interpretation is that
consideration for the environment does not, in this case, motivate a modi-
ﬁcation of the income tax structure. Does this result carry over to a large










∂Li > 0 (25)
and consider Proposition 4;
Proposition 4 In the symmetric noncooperative Nash equilibrium, where
the producer price of the dirty good is endogenous to the national govern-








Proof: See the Appendix.
Proposition 4 is a consequence of a more general result; if there are fewer
policy instruments than variables to control, then the tax on the dirty good
no longer constitutes a perfect environmental policy instrument. The in-
tuition is that the government of country i cannot use ti alone in order to
exercise control over both Xi and Xk. Therefore, it will use other policy
instruments as well - in this case the marginal income tax rate - for the
explicit purpose of inﬂuencing the environmental damage.
The formula in Proposition 4 implies that the income tax serves as an
’indirect instrument’ to increase the producer price of the dirty good, which
i sd e s i r a b l ef o rt h en a t i o n a lg o v e r n m e n ta sl o n ga sμi/γi > 0.C l e a r l y ,o n e
way to increase the producer price is to reduce the supply of the dirty good.
This provides an incentive for the national government to choose a higher
marginal income tax rate than it would otherwise have done, which leads
to fewer hours of work and, therefore, less output. Note that this result
is further strengthened if the utility function is weakly separable in the
environmental damage; this case implies that μi/γi is always greater that
zero in our framework, so T0(wiLi) > 0.

















d/∂Li < 0, and consider Proposition 5;
Proposition 5 In the symmetric noncooperative Nash equilibrium, where
the producer price of the dirty good is endogenous to the national govern-









Proof: See the Appendix.
Proposition 5 implies overprovision of the public good relative to the Samuel-
son rule. The intuition is that, if the government increases production of the
public good, employment in the private sector is crowded out. This reduces
the supply of the dirty good and increases the producer price. Therefore, to
be able to reap the additional beneﬁt of a cleaner domestic environment (as
a higher producer price reduces the consumption of the dirty good by the
resident in the other country), the government produces more of the public
good than it would otherwise have done.
4 Policy Coordination
The results derived in the previous section suggest that, if each national
government is able to aﬀect the producer prices, this does not only mean
that the commodity tax on the externality-generating good is likely to be
ineﬃciently low seen from the perspective of global well-being; it also implies
that the marginal income tax rate is ineﬃciently high, and that too much
resources are spent on public goods. An interesting question, therefore, is
whether policy coordination can be designed in such a way, that welfare
17increases in both countries? Here, we will not interpret the concept of ’co-
operation’ such that the countries pool their resources in order to implement
a cooperative equilibrium (even if this is a common approach in earlier liter-
ature). It is more realistic to assume that they agree upon smaller projects,
the purposes of which are to improve the resource allocation in compari-
son with the initial equilibrium. We will not discuss the conditions under
which such international agreements are likely to be formed; only the welfare
consequences if they arise.
To simplify the analysis and be able to derive clear-cut results, we add the
assumption that Zi, Gi and E are all weakly separable from the other goods
in the utility function, which implies that the conditional demand functions
for Ci and Xi reduce to Ci = C(Qi,Bi) and Xi = X(Qi,Bi), respectively.
Since we are considering a symmetric equilibrium, we only have to evaluate
the eﬀects for one country in order to say something about global welfare.
Then, by observing that the national welfare equals the national Lagrangean
















































































To interpret equation (26), recall that the noncooperative Nash equilibrium
means that each national government has made an optimal policy choice on
18a national basis. As a consequence, a small change in a domestic decision
variable will have a zero ﬁrst order domestic welfare eﬀect. This explains
why changes in Lk, Lk
G, tk and Bk aﬀect the welfare in country i,w h e r e a s
changes in the corresponding domestic decision variables do not.
A reform will always consist of a change in (at least) two policy variables,
because the government must balance the budget. Let us, therefore, use
equation (26) to ﬁnd possible pairwise changes in policy variables, which
unambiguously increase welfare. Consider Proposition 6;
Proposition 6If the initial resource allocation is represented by the non-
cooperative Nash equilibrium with endogenous producer prices, it is welfare
improving to;
(i) increase the commodity tax, while the post-tax private income and total
hours of work are held constant (via adjustments of the income tax), and
use the additional tax revenues to increase the production of the public good.
(ii) reduce the total hours of work and simultaneously reduce the post-tax
private income to keep the tax revenues unchanged.
(iii) reduce the post-tax private income (given the total hours of work and
the commodity tax) and use the additional tax revenues to increase the pro-
duction of the public good.
Reform (i) means that dBk = dLk =0 ,w h i l edtk > 0 and dLk
G > 0,s o
dV i > 0. The intuition for why a coordinated increase in the commodity tax
increases welfare is straight forward; higher commodity taxation in country
k reduces the environmental damage in country i and vice versa. However,
note that we are only considering an inﬁnitesimal change in the commodity
tax in a noncooperative Nash equilibrium, meaning that this hypothetical
reform does not increase the commodity tax all the way to the ﬁrst best level;
we are still in the second best where the consumer price of the dirty good is
ineﬃciently low from the perspective of global well-being. To be more spe-
ciﬁc, since the public policy in the noncooperative Nash equilibrium is based
19on domestic objectives (where each national government underestimates the
full welfare eﬀect of pushing up the producer price of the dirty good), ad-
ditional marginal policy coordination leads to higher welfare if it increases
the producer price. This is accomplished here as the countries agree to use
the additional tax revenues to hire more labor in the public sector which,
in turn, crowds out part of the employment in the private sector, implying
that P and, therefore, Qk will increase.
Reform (ii) means that dtk = dLk
G =0 , while dBk < 0 and dLk < 0.
Eﬀectively, this implies an increase in the marginal income tax rate (which
reduces Lk), accompanied by an increase in the average income tax rate
(which reduces Bk). A reduction of Lk has a negative eﬀect on private sector
output; as such, it contributes to increase P and, therefore, Qk,w h i c hl e a d s
to higher welfare in country i. In addition, the associated decrease in Bk
reduces the consumption of Xk (recall that Xk is a normal good), which
also contributes to higher welfare in country i. Therefore, and somewhat
surprisingly, although the marginal income tax rate is ineﬃc i e n t l yh i g hi nt h e
noncooperative Nash equilibrium, increasing the marginal income tax rate
will, nevertheless, lead to higher welfare. The intuition is, again, that the
prereform resource allocation is a noncooperative Nash equilibrium, where
the consumer price of the dirty good is ineﬃciently low from the perspective
of global well-being.
Finally, reform (iii) means dtk = dLk =0 ,w h i l edBk < 0 and dLk
G > 0.
The interpretation is that a lower Bk (via a higher average income tax rate)
tends to reduce Xk, which is welfare improving for country i.N o t e t h a t
this hypothetical reform also means that the marginal income tax rate is
adjusted to keep Lk unchanged. The associated increase in the production
of the public good also contributes to higher welfare, as it tends to increase
the producer price of the dirty good. In other words, it is welfare improv-
ing to increase the provision of public good (conditional on the ineﬃciently
low consumer price of the dirty good in the noncooperative Nash equilib-
20rium), although the public good is already too large relative to the ﬁrst best
Samuelson rule.
5 Summary and Discussion
This paper characterizes the optimal income and commodity tax structure
in a two-country economy. There are two private goods (produced and
consumed in both countries); a clean and a dirty (externality-generating)
good. The two commodities are subject to international trade, and we as-
sume that the aggregate consumption of the dirty good (measured over both
countries) gives rise to a transboundary environmental problem. Each na-
tional government is assumed to face a mixed tax problem, where the set of
tax instruments consists of a nonlinear income tax and a linear commodity
t a xo nt h ed i r t yg o o d .C o n t r a r yt oe a r l i e rl i t e r a t u r ei nt h i sa r e a ,w ea s s u m e
that the producer prices are endogenous to each national government; the
idea is that each country is large in the sense that its government can sig-
niﬁcantly aﬀect the world market producer prices via public policy. This is
easily motivated because the environmental policy scene is to some extent
characterized by large actors, where the price-taking assumption appears to
be less realistic.
In order to highlight the importance of endogenous world market pro-
ducer prices for externality-correction, our model disregards motives other
than externality-correction for using distortionary taxation. As a conse-
quence, if we were relax the assumption that the producer prices are en-
dogenous, i.e. imposing ﬁxed producer prices as in much of the earlier liter-
ature, we would ﬁnd that the tax on the externality-generating good equals
the marginal value that the national government attaches to the externality,
and that the marginal income tax is equal to zero. We would also ﬁnd that
the provision of the public good satisﬁes the Samuelson rule. We show that
none of these standard results apply, if the producer prices are treated as
21endogenous by the national governments.
To be more speciﬁc, each national government sets the commodity tax
below the marginal value it attaches to the externality. The intuition is that,
if the producer price is endogenous, then each national government perceives
to have an option of reducing the consumption of the dirty good in the other
country. By reducing its own commodity tax below the domestic marginal
v a l u eo ft h ee x t e r n a l i t y ,t h ed o m e s t i cd e m a n df o rt h ed i r t yg o o di n c r e a s e s
which, in turn, increases the world market price of the dirty good. The
subsequent decrease in foreign consumption increases the domestic welfare.
Each national government also tries to reduce the domestic environmental
damage by choosing a higher marginal income tax rate than it would oth-
erwise have done; this tends to reduce the hours of work and, therefore, the
output of the dirty good. In addition, each national government overprovides
the public good relative to the Samuelson rule.
The ﬁnal part of the paper addresses the welfare eﬀects of policy coor-
dination, where the noncooperative Nash equilibrium constitutes the prere-
form resource allocation. The purposes are to characterize the underlying
cost beneﬁt rule as well as discuss some of its implications for policy reforms.
We exemplify by discussing three coordinated policy reforms, which lead to
higher welfare; (i) a coordinated increase in the commodity tax accompanied
by increased production of the public good, (ii) a coordinated increase in
the marginal and average income tax rates, and (iii) a coordinated reduction
in the post-tax private income accompanied by increased production of the
public good. These policy reforms are welfare improving because, as long as
the commodity tax on the dirty good is set below the ﬁrst best level, it is
welfare improving to increase the producer price of the dirty good. This is
precisely what these reforms accomplish. The intuition is that the prereform
resource allocation is a noncooperative Nash equilibrium, where the policies
are based on domestic objectives. As a consequence, in the pre-reform equi-
librium each national government underestimates the global welfare eﬀect
22of pushing up the producer price, which makes it welfare improving to co-
ordinate policies.


















































































































for k 6= i,w h e r eV i
B = ∂V i/∂Bi, V i
Z = ∂V i/∂Zi, V i
G = ∂V i/∂Giand
V i
E = ∂V i/∂E. To derive equations (A.2) and (A.4), we have used the
time constraint Li = Li
c + Li
d + Li
























in which we have used that the net export of the dirty good is zero in the
symmetric equilibrium.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3
Let us substitute (A.7) into (A.1) and (A.3), divide by γi and rearrange the






























































































for k 6= i. By using Cramer’s rule to solve for ti and V i














































Recall that the producer price is implicitly deﬁned by equation (13). Diﬀer-
































































which is the tax formula in Proposition 3. Note that by substituting equa-
tions (A.12) and (A.13) into equation (A.10) gives V i
B/γi =1 .
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2








ρi > 0 (A.16)
Next, substitute V i
E = −V i
BMWPi
E,B and equations (A.15) and (A.16) into





























w h e r ew eh a v eu s e dt h a tV i
B = γi.T o e v a l u a t e ∂P/∂E,w ed i ﬀerentiate


































Since the expression within parenthesis equals ti,w ec a nr e a r r a n g ee q u a t i o n
(A.19) to the formula in Proposition 2.
25P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4


























































W ec a nt h e nm u l t i p l ye q u a t i o n( A . 2 0 )b ywi and add the resulting expression














w h e r ew eh a v eu s e dV i
BwiTi
I = V i
Bwi − V i
Z.S i n c eV i
B = γi, we can rearrange
equation (A.23) to obtain the formula in Proposition 4.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5
By diﬀerentiating equation (13) with respect to Li





















where we have used V i
B = γi and MRSi
G,B = V i
G/V i
B. Next, substitute








Combining equations (A.26) and (A.27) gives the formula in Proposition
5.
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